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The changing circumstances in which parties compete in contemporary democracies, 
coupled with the changing circumstances in which governments now govern, have led 
to a widening of the traditional gap between representative and responsible govern-
ment. Although it is generally seen as desirable that parties in government are both 
representative and responsible, these two characteristics are now becoming increasingly 
incompatible. Prudence and consistency in government, as well as accountability, re-
quire conformity to external constraints and legacies. This means more than just an-
swering to public opinion. While these external constraints and legacies have become 
weightier in recent years, public opinion, in its turn, has become harder and harder for 
governments to read. Hence we see the growing incompatibility. Meanwhile, because 
of changes in their organizations and in their relationship with civil society, parties are 
no longer in a position to bridge or “manage” this gap, or even to persuade voters to ac-
cept it as a necessary element in political life. This growing incompatibility is one of the 
principal sources of the democratic malaise that confronts many Western democracies 
today.
Zusammenfassung
Die sich wandelnden Rahmenbedingungen für Regierungen und für den Parteienwett-
bewerb in modernen Demokratien haben zu einer Verbreiterung der traditionellen Kluft 
zwischen repräsentativem und responsivem Regieren geführt. Obgleich von regierenden 
Parteien erwartet wird, dass sie sowohl repräsentativ als auch responsiv handeln, lassen 
sich diese beiden Vorgehensweisen immer schwerer miteinander vereinbaren. Eine um-
sichtig und nachhaltig handelnde Regierung, die ihrer Rechenschaftspflicht gegenüber 
dem Bürger nachkommt, darf sich nicht nur an der öffentlichen Meinung orientie-
ren, sondern muss externe Sachzwänge ebenso berücksichtigen wie die Vermächtnisse 
vorhergehender Regierungen – zwei Faktoren, die in den letzten Jahren an Bedeutung 
gewonnen haben. Hinzu kommt, dass die öffentliche Meinung für Regierungen immer 
schwieriger zu deuten ist. Aufgrund von strukturellen Veränderungen sowie Verände-
rungen in ihrem Verhältnis zu den Bürgern sind die Parteien inzwischen nicht mehr in 
der Lage, die entstandene Kluft zu überbrücken beziehungsweise zu handhaben oder 
gar ihre Wähler davon zu überzeugen, sie als unverzichtbaren Bestandteil des politi-
schen Lebens zu akzeptieren. Die zunehmende Unvereinbarkeit repräsentativen und 
responsiven Regierens ist eine der Haupt¬ursachen für die „Politikverdrossenheit“, mit 
der sich viele westliche Demokratien heute konfrontiert sehen.
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Introduction
The theme of this paper concerns changes – in political parties, in party systems, and in 
government-opposition relations. I argue that the traditional gap between responsive 
and responsible government has become wider and less manageable because of changes 
in the circumstances in which parties compete, on the one hand, and in which govern-
ments govern, on the other. Meanwhile, due to changes in their organizations and in 
their relationship with civil society, parties are no longer able to bridge this gap or even 
to persuade voters to accept it as a necessary element in political life. This, I argue, is 
one of the principal sources of the democratic malaise that confronts many Western 
democracies today. 
The argument concerning changing parties is a familiar one, and one that I have devel-
oped already in a number of different publications (e.g., Katz/Mair 1995, 2009; Mair 
2005, 2008). For a variety of reasons – linked to social structure, organization and geo-
politics, as well as simply the sheer force of attrition – the character of parties and 
party competition is changing fundamentally. In turn, the character of our democra-
cies is also changing. In brief, parties played two major roles in the development and 
organization of modern democracies. First, they acted as representatives – articulating 
interests, aggregating demands, translating collective preferences into distinct policy 
options, and so on. They linked civil society to the polity and did so from a very strong 
and well-grounded foundation in society. Parties gave voice to the citizenry. Second, 
parties governed. They organized and gave coherence to the institutions of government. 
From their positions in government and in opposition, they sought to build the policy 
programs that would serve the interests of their supporters and of the wider polity.
The unique contribution parties offered to the development of modern democracy and 
to the process of legitimizing democracy was that they combined these crucial two roles 
into one. That is, the key representative and governing functions of the polity were 
developed within one agency and within one organization – the party. The same orga-
nization that governed the citizenry also gave that citizenry voice, and the same organi-
zation that channeled representation also managed the institutions of the polity. This 
was the key to the legitimation of representative government in democratic political 
systems. To adopt a more prosaic reference, it was a process in which there were few, if 
any, principal-agent problems: the principal was the agent. 
As I have argued elsewhere, this situation no longer prevails. In contemporary democ-
racies, the two functions that were once combined by party have begun to grow apart, 
with many of today’s parties downplaying, or being forced to downplay, their represen-
tative role, and enhancing, or being forced to enhance, their governing role. In other 
words, as part of the process by which parties moved their centers of gravity from civil 
society to the state (Katz/Mair 1995), they have also begun to shift from combining rep-
resentative and governmental (procedural or institutional) roles to strengthening their 
governmental role alone.
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Another way of looking at this is to suggest that parties have moved from representing 
interests of the citizens to the state to representing interests of the state to the citizens. 
Meanwhile, the representation of the citizens, to the extent that it still occurs at all, is 
given over to other, nongoverning organizations and practices – to interest groups, so-
cial movements, advocacy coalitions, lobbies, the media, self-representation, etc. – that 
are disconnected from the party system. In this way, representation becomes less and 
less a function of the activities of partisan political organizations and more and more 
something that is realized through a contemporary and often depoliticized version of 
pluralism. 
In this way, political parties become more like governors than representatives, at least 
within the mainstream or core of the party system. Representation itself either moves 
out of the electoral channel altogether or, when it remains within the electoral channel, 
becomes the primary preserve of so-called “niche” or “challenger” parties, which may 
downplay a governing ambition or which may lack a governing capacity (see also Katz/
Mair 2008). I will come back later to this last point.
When parties began to focus more attention on their activities within the institutions 
and on the demands of governing it seemed that they were reaching for a new and po-
tentially sustainable role within the polity. Although this involved downplaying their 
representative role, it did not appear necessarily to damage their status or standing. 
Rather, the shift implied the emergence of a new division of labor within the demo-
cratic polity, whereby parties would govern, or primarily govern and other agencies 
would look after the citizens’ representative needs. 
This also suited parties for a variety of reasons, two of which are worth emphasizing. 
In the first place, the steadily growing accessibility to the governing process for more 
and more parties in the 1970s and 1980s turned the ambition to govern into a much 
more realistic and manageable goal for more and more party leaders. In much the same 
way that a professorship appears in the eyes of an emerging academic, holding office in 
government became part of the conventional career cycle and the focus of ambition for 
both parties and their leaders. As Borchert (e.g. 2008) shows, this was also an inevitable 
consequence of political professionalization. Moreover, as resources inside parties shift-
ed from the party on the ground and in the central office to the party in public office, 
the ambitions of the party in public office were transformed into the ambitions of the 
party as a whole. For many party leaders, parties were governors or they were nothing.
The second reason why this shift suited parties is because representation as such was be-
coming more difficult. The decline of the traditional large collective constituencies, the 
fragmentation of electorates, the particularization of voter preferences, and the volatil-
ity of issue preferences and alignment – that whole process which the Dutch refer to as 
the ontzuiling and individualization of cleavage structures – made it more and more 
difficult for parties to read interests, let alone aggregate them within coherent electoral 
programs. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that parties found it difficult to maintain their 
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far-reaching representative role, given that they were operating in a context in which col-
lective identities in general were fragementing, and in which representation as such was 
becoming more difficult to realize (Andeweg 2003: 151). 
So what do this pattern of party change and the new role of political parties imply for 
the format and mechanics of the party systems in which these parties compete? The key 
issue here is that parties can no longer be seen as purposive actors who seek to imple-
ment – or prevent the implementation – of a particular program and who do this on 
behalf of a given electoral constituency. Party government no longer operates in this 
traditional sense. Even when this can be stipulated, however, it still begs the obvious 
question: what else remains for party competition and party purpose? If parties cannot 
compete – whether defensively or aggressively – about representation, on what basis can 
they compete and seek to acquire a mandate? And how does this affect party systems?
Instrumental and expressive voting
Before proposing an answer to this question, I will step back a bit from my focus on the 
party end of the party competition equation and the supply side and look instead at 
the electoral end of the equation and hence at voting. According to Rose and McAllister 
(1992: 115), who echo a larger body of literature, there are two ways of looking at voting 
and of conceiving how voters approach elections and parties – namely, the instrumental 
view and the expressive view:
The instrumental view of voting is a macro perspective: the main function of an election is the 
production of government […] By contrast, the expressive theory of voting is micro-level; the 
function of an election is to give individuals an opportunity to express their preferences.
Although couched in macro and micro terms, this distinction also implies that the vot-
ers themselves have a choice of orientations, or at least that they may differ from one 
another in terms of their orientations. That is, the voters may either act expressively, as 
is always assumed to be most clearly the case in second-order elections, for example, 
where no primary contest is in play; or they can act instrumentally, as is always assumed 
to be most clearly the case in majoritarian systems, for example, in particular in West-
minster elections.
This is not entirely a matter of individual voter choice, of course; it is also driven by 
the context of the party system, and by the way in which parties supply choices. Thus, 
as Rose and McAllister (1992: 121) go on to argue, “In the overwhelming majority of 
democratic political systems, voters must act expressively, for there is a multiplicity of 
parties competing, and there is no simple swing of votes between an In and Out party.”
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In other words, some systems, and these would include many of what Lijphart (1999) 
defines as consensus democracy systems, encourage expressive voting, whereas others – 
Lijphart’s majoritarian democracies – encourage a more instrumental approach on the 
part of voters. Stein Rokkan (1970: 93) once made a similar distinction. “In some coun-
tries,” he suggested, 
elections have had the character of an effective choice among alternative teams of governors, in 
others they have simply served to express segmental loyalties and to ensure the right of each 
segment to some representation, even if only a single portfolio, in a coalition cabinet.
While this is all well and good, it does beg an additional question: what happens when 
the form of the parties presented to voters fails to correspond to the prevailing orienta-
tions held by voters? In particular, what happens in multiparty contexts when, following 
Rose and McAllister, voters must act expressively, and yet when the parties in this same 
context no longer offer an expressive capacity? To put it another way, if Rose and McAl-
lister’s distinction between expressive and instrumental voting is to make sense, then 
the parties themselves are required to fulfill these conditions. Expressive voting requires 
expressive parties. It requires parties that place a premium, or at least an electoral pre-
mium, on their claims to represent. Once the mainstream parties – and these arguments 
apply primarily if not exclusively to the mainstream – cede the capacity or willingness 
to be representative, expressive voting cannot make sense. Hence voters will either be 
induced to shift towards an alternative logic of voting or will find themselves searching 
around for other parties that can claim to act as representatives. In short, if parties – or 
some parties – fail to be representative, then voters will be obliged either to shift their 
orientations or to shift their preferences. The latter option is difficult, of course, but not 
impossible, given the presence of niche parties (Meguid 2005) and “anti-party system” 
parties. It is more likely, however, that voters will be inclined to shift their orientations 
or abstain altogether.
This is the tension that is now beginning to fuel the trend towards bipolarism in contem-
porary party systems. By bipolarism I refer here to the tendency for parties in multiparty 
systems to group together to offer alternative governments and pre-electoral coalitions, 
thus giving voters the opportunity to choose between alternative teams of leaders even 
within the context of fragmented multiparty politics. This growing trend means that 
parties are now more likely to group together in ways that allow multiparty elections to 
become decisive for the formation of governments. This also means that greater scope 
can be afforded to instrumental voting even within otherwise uncongenial arenas. Italy 
is the most obvious example of such a transformation, but the trend towards bipolar-
ism – often in fits and starts, and also sometimes with reversals – has also been evident 
in Germany, Austria, and France. Moreover, many of the new third- and fourth-wave 
democracies in Europe, beginning in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and moving more 
recently to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, are also often bipolar in charac-
ter, whether through two-party systems or through bipolar multiparty systems. Thirty 
years ago, bipolar systems were relatively rare; today, they are emerging as one of the 
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dominant forms of party system. Yet it is also important to underscore the fact that in 
many cases these bipolar systems are not simply two-party systems. Rather, competi-
tion ensues between two alternating and sometimes shifting coalitions, through which 
elections become decisive for government formation even within the context of in-
creasingly fragmented multiparty politics.
This also suggests that we can begin to speak of a functional and systemic response to 
party change, and indeed this is the first conclusion of this paper: when parties become 
less expressive – less oriented to representation – it seems that they become more in-
clined to present themselves to voters as governors and to ask to be judged as governors. 
This means that they must organize competition in such a way as to offer choices be-
tween Ins and Outs and to give voters the opportunity to use elections to “throw the 
rascals out.” 
If an emphasis on representation and expressiveness encourages prospective voting, an 
emphasis on a more instrumental orientation may therefore be seen to encourage retro-
spective voting – judging the incumbents on how well they have performed and on how 
well they have managed the polity and judging the opposition in terms of how much 
better or worse they might have done had they been in office (see also Andeweg 2003). 
When individual parties compete, it might well be in terms of what they offer for the 
future; when alternative governments compete, they are more likely to talk about how 
they have, or might have, performed in the past. 
Thus, it does seem that we can speak of the emergence of a new balance in contem-
porary party systems. Parties have downplayed their claim to representation and have 
thereby placed less reliance on expressive and prospective voting. Instead, they have 
begun to emphasize their capacity as good governors, administrators, and managers of 
the polity. In so doing, they have learned to forge alternative and competing electoral 
coalitions through which a more instrumental voting can be facilitated even within a 
multiparty context. Parties may have changed, but they also have adapted to a new elec-
toral logic by reshaping the structures of competition that define their party systems. 
To paraphrase Tony Blair, political parties – mainstream political parties – have become 
committed to “what works.” This is what informs their modes of competition and the 
choices they offer voters.
This is all well and good. The argument might also stop here – leaving us with a new 
rough and ready equilibrium that is more in tune with the new roles of parties and the 
new patterns of competition. As a result, there would be no need to talk of a democratic 
malaise or of a crisis of legitimacy. In this new order, politics and party competition 
would be different, but not necessarily less effective or less legitimate. In practice, how-
ever, as I will go on to argue in the remaining part of the paper, this new equilibrium is 
far from stable and is confronted with two major sources of strain.
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Legitimacy and responsibility
In the first place, the equilibrium is strained by the problem of legitimacy. The capacity 
of parties to govern, in particular their capacity to justify or legitimize their claim to 
govern, depends at least in part on their capacity to represent. They might well be able 
to represent without governing,1 but they have difficulty when they seek to govern with-
out representing. This point was already argued by Giovanni Sartori (2005 [1967]: 29) 
more than forty years ago in his discussion on the centrality of so-called expressive 
functions to parties:
If we have the party as a recruiter, it is because we want “representative” leadership, that is, 
because we are interested in a mechanism of recruitment that fulfills the expressive function. 
Supposing that parties do not secure representative leadership […] then why should we have 
recourse to party recruitment? Surely the answer is not that parties remain the best means of 
qualitative selection. Qualitatively speaking, the party channel has often produced very poor 
leadership.
In other words, if parties lack representative legitimacy, then it is difficult to justify their 
acquisition of a governing role or to argue against passing the whole business of gov-
erning directly to the judges, regulatory agencies, and the like. Without representation, 
it is difficult to make the case for privileging parties above administrators and experts, 
however effective they might be at managing government. 
The second source of strain in the equilibrium is more immediate and more tangible, 
and it is this which brings me to the notion of responsibility. It is a commonplace to 
note that all democratic governments have always had to maintain a balance between 
demands for responsiveness, on the one hand, and demands for responsibility, on the 
other; in other words, echoing Scharpf (1999), all governments have had to maintain a 
balance between democracy and efficiency. Today, however, in the new circumstances of 
party politics, the tension between these two demands has increased, and it is becoming 
more and more difficult to reconcile them. Moreover, and this is where I come to the 
core of my argument: not only are the demands for responsiveness and the demands for 
responsibility increasingly at odds with one another, but the parties’ capacity to recon-
cile and resolve the growing tension between them has also been undermined. In other 
words, the tension itself is becoming steadily more acute, while the means of handling 
that tension are steadily waning. It is here that we find the basis of the contemporary 
crises of governance and democracy. 
Let me restate this argument more carefully, beginning with the notion of responsibility. 
Responsibility is itself a difficult term and has been used in very different ways in the 
various bodies of political science literature. For Sartori (1976: 18–24), for example, as 
1 As they do in the European Parliament, for example – see Mair and Thomassen (forthcoming 
2010), who examine some of the issues raised in this paper within the context of the European 
Union.
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well as for many of the U.S. advocates of the “responsible party model” in the 1950s and 
1960s (e.g., APSA 1950), responsibility essentially boils down to accountability. Political 
actors, their parties, and their governments give account to parliament and/or to the 
people and are in this sense accountable and thereby responsible. For Downs (1957: 
105), by contrast, responsibility implies predictability and consistency: a party is re-
sponsible “if its policies in one period are consistent with its actions (or statements) in 
the preceding period” and hence “the absence of responsibility means party behaviour 
cannot be predicted by consistently projecting what parties have done previously.” Par-
ties with strong and consistent social roots, for example, or those which are bound by a 
strict ideology are more likely to be responsible in this Downsian sense. For Rieselbach 
(1977: 8–10), who proposes responsibility, responsiveness, and accountability as three 
standards against which the U.S. Congress – or any legislature – might be evaluated, 
responsibility implies efficiency and effectiveness: 
[A] responsible institution provides reasonably successful policies to resolve the major prob-
lems it is faced with. The emphasis of the responsibility criterion is on speed, efficiency, and, of 
course, success.
None of these definitions is entirely satisfactory, in that none pays sufficient attention 
to a more conventional notion of responsibility which implies that a responsible person 
is one who acts within the bounds of accepted practice, who follows known legal and 
procedural rules and conventions, and who thereby acts from a sense of duty. This is 
the conventional sense in which, for example, we speak of a responsible parent or a 
responsible teacher or a responsible journalist. It is something we also associate with 
professionalism, and in this more conventional sense it implies the opposite of reck-
lessness. Indeed, in political life in particular, as well as in the commercial world, it 
may also be counterposed to corruption. It is this meaning which is implied when, for 
example, it is expected that a political actor “lives up to her responsibilities,” and it is 
also this meaning which – quite exceptionally – is highlighted by Anthony Birch (1964) 
in his classic study of the British constitution. For Birch, responsibility implies not only 
responsiveness and accountability – the two notions highlighted by the U.S. advocates 
of the “responsible party model,” for example – but also “prudence and consistency on 
the part of those taking decisions.” As Birch goes on to emphasize, this latter meaning 
evokes notions of duty and of moral responsibility. Here, too, it is contrasted with reck-
less or inconsistent decision-making. 
Taking Birch on board, then, we are confronted with three distinct concepts, each of 
which is in some way associated with the broader notion of responsibility. The first is 
responsiveness, whereby political leaders or governments listen to and then respond to 
the demands of citizens and groups. This may also be associated with the traditional 
understanding of party government and party democracy, in which parties and their 
leaders acquire a mandate through elections and go on to implement the chosen poli-
cies while in government. In Andeweg’s (2003) terms, this involves representation ex 
ante and obviously builds on the expressive function of parties.
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The second concept is accountability, whereby political leaders or governments are held 
to account by parliaments or by voters. The judgment of these citizens or parliaments 
may be based on evaluations of how responsive the leaders have been and on how well 
they have acted as delegates or agents of the bodies or principals carrying out the evalu-
ation; or it may reflect a “trustee” type of relationship, in which the leaders make their 
own judgments and are subsequently evaluated on their performance. Either way, both 
judgments involve ex-post evaluation and, as I have argued above, following Andeweg 
(2003), this seems to have become more important as traditional ex-ante representation 
– responsiveness – becomes more difficult to realize. In other words, there is a potential 
trade-off between responsiveness and accountability, with a weakening of the former 
being compensated by a greater emphasis on the latter; or, in Scharpf ’s (1999) terms, 
with the failings of input-oriented legitimacy being compensated by a greater reliance 
on output-oriented legitimacy. 
The third concept, following Birch, is responsibility in the narrower and more formal-
ized sense of the term, whereby leaders and governments are expected to act prudently 
and consistently and to follow accepted procedural norms and practices. This also means 
living up to the commitments that have been entered into by their predecessors in office 
and abiding by agreements that these predecessors have made with other governments 
and institutions. In other words, responsibility involves an acceptance that, in certain 
areas and in certain procedures, the leaders’ hands will be tied. Of course, the hands may 
also be eventually loosened and the leader may break with established traditions and 
practices – but even in these cases, to act responsibly means to effect changes according 
to accepted procedures and to avoid random, reckless, or illegal decision-making. In 
terms of procedures, responsible government is therefore “good” government. 
So how do these three notions fit together? The first two obviously fit together in the 
sense that the declining representative capacity of parties leads to greater emphasis 
on retrospective accountability than on prospective mandates. Indeed, regardless of 
whether the parties in government are standing in relation to parliament and the voters 
as accountable trustees or as responsive delegates, there is a clear and relatively unam-
biguous principal-agent relationship involved (Strøm et al. 2003). The parties in gov-
ernment are the agent, and voters – whether acting directly or though parliament – are 
the principal. 
The relationship of both concepts with responsibility is much more problematic. In this 
case, there is not a single, more or less straightforward principal that the parties in gov-
ernment meet when dealing with the voters or the parliament, but rather a host of dif-
ferent and sometimes contradictory principals constituted by the many veto and semi-
veto players who now surround government in its dispersed multi-level institutional 
setting: the central banks, the courts, the European Commission, the Council of Europe, 
the WTO, the United Nations and its various offshoots, and so on. Parties in govern-
ment are also evidently accountable to these sometime principals, and it is when these 
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governing parties continue to respect the rulings and procedures laid down by these 
institutions that we can speak of them being consistent, prudent, and responsible. 
Hence the key difference is not between prospective responsiveness and retrospective 
accountability, which governments can try to square in any case, but between both of 
these forms of control, each with the same basic principal, on the one hand, and the 
problem of responsibility with its host of different and sometimes competing princi-
pals, on the other. This is where the key incompatibilities also lie, with the demands of 
responsiveness – to voters and to parliament – proving particularly difficult to reconcile 
with the demands of responsibility. 
This is also an old problem and is closely linked to Dahl’s (1956) traditional distinction 
between populist and Madisonian democracy, as well as to the more common contem-
porary distinction between efficient and democratic government (e.g., Scharpf 1999). 
So why should this tension now be a matter of greater concern?
Responsiveness and responsibility: A growing tension
There are four factors in particular that are important here. First and as already dis-
cussed above, governments are now finding it increasingly difficult to be responsive to 
voters and to electoral opinion simply in the sense that they are finding it increasingly 
difficult to read and aggregate preferences and to persuade voters to align behind their 
policies. This is partly because they have withdrawn from civil society and are therefore 
out of touch with electoral demands, and partly because they now maintain smaller 
and increasingly unrepresentative party memberships and thereby lack mechanisms for 
steering communication upward through the party organization. Moreover, the parties 
have often severed their ties with the major mass organizations in civil society, orga-
nizations which in any case are themselves less able to communicate with the wider 
citizenry. Hence, parties lack access to that particular channel of communication. It is 
not party change alone that is relevant here; mass electoral opinion has also become 
more fragmented and volatile, with the result that fewer and fewer stable landmarks 
exist around which the parties can orient themselves. As Russell Hardin (2000) has 
argued, the general decline in the importance of left-right economic competition and 
the general growth of a host of often unrelated complex issues together preclude the 
organization of politics along a single simple dimension. Even if parties in government 
were in a position to respond to popular demands, they would find it difficult to do 
so because they would find it difficult to know what those demands actually were (see 
also Thomassen 1994). In short, the tension becomes more acute simply because it has 
become more difficult for parties to be responsive.
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Second, in seeking to act responsibly – that is, in trying to do what they are expected 
to do as governments and in trying to meet the everyday responsibilities of office – 
governments now find themselves more and more constrained by other agencies and 
institutions. In other words, the range of principals who oblige governments to behave 
in a particular way and who define the terms of reference of responsibility has expanded 
enormously. This is a growing problem in that the Europeanization and international-
ization of policy parameters, reflected in what Ruggie (1997) and Scharpf (2000) treat 
as “the decline of embedded liberalism,” oblige governments to be accountable to an 
increasing number of principals, many of whom are not located within the domestic 
realm and most of whom are difficult to control. By disembedding liberalism, globaliza-
tion in general and Europeanization in particular create many new principals to whom 
governments must act responsibly. This also makes it even more difficult for voters to 
see or understand the rationale behind certain decisions, which also provokes tensions. 
In a similar argument addressed to patterns of delegation in parliamentary democracies, 
Kaare Strøm (2003: 60) points out that external political constraints can get in the way 
of representative politics by prohibiting certain forms of agency or by “forcing agents 
into behaviour that neither they nor their [own domestic] principals would have freely 
chosen.” Even though governments might be willing to heed their voters’ demands – if 
they could read them properly – they may well be limited in doing so by having “other 
constitutionally prescribed roles to play.” This is not a new problem, to be sure, but it 
has become weightier and more serious. This means that we are dealing with voter de-
mands that are not so easily understood by parties in government, as well as with gov-
ernments that are not always in a position to respond to those that they do understand. 
There is also a third cumulating factor at work here, which was originally highlighted 
by Richard Rose (1990) some time ago and which concerns the constraints imposed by 
the legacies inherited by governments. As Rose argued, most of what governments do is 
a function of what they have inherited rather than what they have chosen. In the mid-
1980s, for example, the then radical Thatcher government was still maintaining and 
funding 207 of the 227 programs that it had inherited from the previous Labour regime 
(many of which had also been inherited by Labour) and, after six years in office, it had 
initiated just 28 new programs. In terms of the total program cost to the government 
in 1985, less than 6 percent of expenditure was occupied by newly created programs 
(Rose 1990: 279–280). In acting “responsibly,” governments are therefore not only lim-
ited by their own domestic constitutional constraints and by the growing weight of 
international constitutional constraints – deriving from the EU or Council of Europe 
in the European case, and from the UN and the international legal system more glob-
ally – but also by the weight of prior policy commitments, a weight which, by definition, 
grows heavier year by year.2 As Paul Pierson (2000: 480) points out, political actors, who 
would normally be expected to place a premium on short-term interests, 
2 For an extensive discussion of these cumulating problems in application to the German case, see 
Streeck (2006, 2007).
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can make beneficial long-term bargains if they can “tie their hands” (or those of their suc-
cessors), increasing the confidence of other participants that agreements will not be exploited. 
Institutions can be designed to disable discretion, making commitments credible and therefore 
lengthening the relevant time horizons for all concerned.
But while this is well and good for the actors who strike these bargains in the first place, 
the commitments they make inevitably serve to constrain those who follow them. This 
is true for the European treaties from Rome to Lisbon, as well as for the Kyoto protocols 
and the WTO accords. Indeed, with time, the inherited weight of these prior commit-
ments has grown enormously, and the room for discretionary maneuver available to 
any one government at any one time has become correspondingly curtailed. 
In his discussion of responsible government in the British case, Birch (1964: 170) em-
phasizes the familiar point that responsiveness and responsibility are both generally 
seen as desirable, although they are not always compatible. This is also my main point 
here. Not only are these features of party government sometimes incompatible, they 
are also increasingly incompatible, in that prudence and consistency, as well as account-
ability, requires conformity to external constraints and legacies and not just to public 
opinion. These external constraints and legacies have become weightier in recent years, 
while public opinion, in its turn, has become harder and harder to read. This is the 
growing imbalance.
The fourth factor that I wish to emphasize here is that, in the past, the traditional 
(and lesser) incompatibility between responsiveness and responsibility could often be 
bridged or “managed” by parties who were able to persuade voters on side through par-
tisan campaigns and appeals to partisan loyalty; this is less easily conceivable today. The 
incompatibility has always troubled parties, of course, and many party governments in 
the past have been quick to cite difficult circumstances, inauspicious developments, or 
simple misjudgments in order to justify the evasion of election commitments or the 
reneging on promises. In addition, parties could also sometimes pull their voters with 
them through the change of direction by appealing to popular loyalty and trust. In con-
temporary circumstances, however, this option is no longer effectively available. Parties 
have almost no members to help mobilize public opinion and have an ever-shrinking 
number of strong partisan identifiers within the electorate who might take them at 
their word. They rarely control the means of political communication and have to rely 
on others for their persuasive capacities. Moreover, as is now well attested, political par-
ties are by far the least trusted institution within modern democracies. For all of these 
reasons, their mobilization capacities are now almost nonexistent.
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Thus we arrive at the present crisis: the constraints on government have become much 
greater, the ability to respond to voters has been much curtailed, and the parties’ ca-
pacity to use their political and organizational resources to bridge or even manage the 
resulting gap has become severely limited. The consequences for representative govern-
ment are therefore likely to be very severe, even though to explore these fully is beyond 
the scope of this brief paper. I will therefore conclude with a number of propositions 
or speculations deriving from this diagnosis, each of which has potentially far-reaching 
implications.
First, and most obviously, it is clear that the task of governing the modern has become 
extremely complex, time-consuming, and demanding, and is something that does not 
afford much room for partisan mobilization either as a core activity or even on the side. 
It therefore follows that parties that are busy governing are busier as governments than 
they are as parties. If they are busy as parties, then either someone else is governing 
– through the displacement of the real decision-making power – or they are governing 
badly. This is a problem for the parties as well as for democracy.
Second, because parties are busy governing, because governing demands so much of 
them, and because there is so little room for partisanship in this governing process, 
much of what they do is depoliticized. To paraphrase Engels’ classic observation,3 par-
ties become busy with the administration of things. This in itself leads to a paradox 
which eats away at their standing: the more the parties depoliticize policy-making, the 
more they are obliged to justify their choices – this is so because these choices, being 
depoliticized, are no longer self-evident choices for their supporters and voters; yet, the 
more parties depoliticize, particularly within contemporary circumstances, the more 
difficult it becomes – as a party – to justify these choices.
Third, since much of what keeps parties in contemporary European governments busy is 
Europe itself – negotiating, understanding, transposing – and since Europe has become 
a very large part of the administration of things, when there is opposition from outside 
the governing circles it is very likely to take on a Euroskeptic hue. To mobilize against 
the government in this sense is also to mobilize again Europe, since Europe is, par ex-
cellence, the business of government. In other words, I suggest that there is a close link 
between Euroskepticism and a more generalized polity-skepticism (Mair 2007). This is 
not only damaging for Europe, but also impacts negatively on national democracy.
Fourth, there are signs that the growing gap between responsiveness and responsibility 
and the declining capacity of parties to bridge or manage that gap is leading to the bifur-
cation of a number of party systems and to a new form of opposition (Katz/Mair 2008). 
3 “die Überführung der politischen Regierung über Menschen in eine Verwaltung von Dingen 
[…]”
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In these systems, governing capacity and vocation becomes the property of one more or 
less closely bounded group of political parties. These are parties that are clearly within 
the mainstream or “core” (Smith 1989) of the party system and that may be able to of-
fer voters a choice of government. If there are alternative teams of leaders presented on 
election day, it is from this group of parties that they will come. Therefore, these are also 
the parties that can offer opportunities for instrumental voting. In contrast, representa-
tion or expression, or the provision of voice to the people, when it doesn’t move wholly 
outside the system, becomes the property of a second group of parties, and it is these 
parties that constitute the new opposition. These latter parties are often characterized 
by a strong populist rhetoric. They rarely govern and also downplay office-seeking mo-
tives. On the rare occasions when they do govern, they sometimes have severe problems 
in squaring their original emphasis on representation and their original role as a voice 
of the people with the constraints imposed by governing and by compromising with 
coalition partners. Moreover, though not the same as the anti-system parties identified 
by Sartori (1976: 138–140), they share with those parties a tendency towards “semi-
responsible” or “irresponsible” opposition as well as towards a “politics of outbidding.” 
In other words, there is a growing bifurcation in European party systems between par-
ties which claim to represent but don’t govern and those which govern but no longer 
represent.
Fifth, and finally, the growing gap between responsiveness and responsibility – or be-
tween what citizens might like governments to do and what governments are obliged 
to do – and the declining capacity of parties to bridge or manage that gap, lies at the 
heart of the disaffection and malaise that now suffuses democracy. This also echoes Jean 
Leca’s (1996) conclusion that there is a growing separation between the world of public 
opinion, on the one hand, and the world of problem-solving, on the other. Govern-
ments solve problems, and hence parties in government solve problems, but they do so 
at an increasing remove from public opinion. 
Seen in this way, and framed as the growing and potentially unbridgeable gap between 
responsive government and responsible government, we have a situation in which the 
malaise is pathological rather than conditional. 
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